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Agroterrorism refers to the instance of bioterrorism against the agricultural and food system. While the 
terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001 against the World Trade Center, Pentagon and targets 
unknown (Flight 97), as well as the subsequent anthrax attacks in Florida and the District of Columbia 
have heightened the awareness of terrorism in general, concerns about agroterrorist threats were raised 
well before that date. Nonetheless, the events of 2001 have initiated widespread, and seemingly 
proactive acts by the U.S. and other international governments to thwart terrorist activities. In the United 
States, the Bush administration has shown its resolve by attacking Al Queda forces in Afghanistan, 
advancing the Homeland Security Bill, and signing in June, 2002 the so-called Bioterrorism Act. 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis has estimated that the September 11
th attacks destroyed $16 
Billion of private and public property, not counting loss of life, the failure of airlines such as Pan Am, 
Sabena, Swiss Air and Canada 3000, layoffs due to lost travel, and increases in domestic and homeland 
security and insurance. On December 27
th , 2001 a taped message from Osama bin Laden stated “It is 
very important to concentrate on hitting the American economy with every available tool…the 
economy is the base of its military power…The United States has a great economy but it is 
fragile”
1 
The agricultural economy is vulnerable to economic sabotage and because of its low elasticity 
may be more fragile than other segments of the economy. Furthermore, the whole notion of food 
security as a national objective is put into jeopardy if any part of the food system is targeted. Indeed the 
evolution of the definitions has remained fairly stable since the mid 1990’s. Derrickson and Brown 
(2002)
2 report the definition of food security by the Life Science and Research Office of American 
Societies of Experimental Biology as “the assured ability to acquire, safe, nutritious, socially, and 
culturally-acceptable foods” with the key phrase being the use of the term “safe”. Likewise they 
whenever the availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods or the 
ability to acquire foods in socially acceptable ways is limited or uncertain”. Keenan et al provide a 
                                                 
1 Islam, M.Q and W. N. Shahin “Applying Economic Methodology to the War on Terrorism” Forum for Social 
Economics (2002):7-26 as reported on AOL News www.aol.com 
2 Derrickson, J., and A.C. Brown “Food Security Stakeholders in Hawai’I: Perceptions of Food Security Monitoring” 





3. By 2002 food safety has become a key component of food security and insecurity. 
Likewise, the term food security has also evolved to include natural and unnatural threats to the food 
system including agro or bioterrorism
4. 
If economic destruction is the goal of terrorist activity then it is critically important to fully 
comprehend the economic motives behind terrorism. This includes developing theoretical and empirical 
models in order to understand motives and opportunities. In other words, can economics be used as a 
tool by terrorists to optimize economic damage?; and if so, can an understanding of that economics be 
used to defend against economic terrorism? Yet the notion of using economics as a countermeasure to 
terrorist activities was not generally considered prior to 2001. Indeed, a search of economics, 
agricultural economics, and agricultural research indices provides only sparse reference to terrorism, 
bioterrorism, or agroterrorism. Yet, within the past year (2002/2003) two reports have emerged from 
the Academy of Sciences dealing with agriculture, food and terrorism. Both reports make an appeal to 
the social sciences to address issues of economics and human behavior. In “Countering Agricultural 
Terrorism”
5 the National Research Council identified four separate research needs; 
1)  Research to understand the perpetrators of agricultural bioterrorism as one approach to deter, 
prevent or thwart bioterrorist attacks,  
2)  Enhance understanding of the concerns of food producers and the public…to develop more 
effective and responsive communication strategies, 
3)  Support research on the social and psychological effects of bioterrorism, including identification 
of high risk groups and ways of assisting affected individuals, families and communities, and 
4)  Investigate methods of educating producers and consumers about plant and animal diseases and 
infestations. 
                                                 
3 Keenan, D. Palmer, C. Olson, J.C. Hersey, and S. M. Parmer “Measures of Food Insecurity/Security” ” J. Nutrition 
and Educational Behaviour 33(2001):s49-s58. 
4 Dilley, M. and T. E. Boudreau “Coming to terms with Vulnerability: A Critique of the F
Food Policy26(2001):229-247 
5 National Research Council of the National Academies Countering Agricultural Terrorism prepublication copy The 




In another report entitled “Making the Nation Safer”
6, the Academy of Science implied (with less 
specificity than the above report), that the relationship between economics and terrorism should be 
explored. In particular the academy was concerned with the relationship between bioterrorism, human 
reactions and risk perceptions. It recommended that modeling tools for analyzing the health and 
economic impacts of bioterrorist attacks are needed in order to anticipate and prepare for these threats. 
Recognizing the relationship between fear and human behaviour the academy also recommended a 
communication strategy with accurate information to soothe and mitigate those fears. The academy 
recommends that historical research on the interrelated sequencing of reactions, interpretations, and 
memories of terrorist events be undertaken to deepen our theoretical and empirical understanding of 
those phenomena (Recommendation 9.8). Importantly, the Academy recognized the importance of path 
dependency which, from a foundation point of view, determines the overall impacts of risk perceptions 
and hysteresis in an economic system, as well as the significance of the theory of games, which allows 
for the investigation of dominating and second-best strategies for terrorist and counter-terrorist activities. 
As a starting point to resolving issues raised by the Academy, an objective of this paper is to 
provide an economic framework that allows for the basic principles of how bioterrorism can impact the 
agricultural and food economy. The model introduces hysteresis, a consequence of fear and risk 
perceptions, on both the supply and demand functions of a simple economy. This allows us to examine, 
at least theoretically, the economic effects of hysteresis by consumers and producers. Understanding 
these issues satisfies, in part, the priorities established in both reports from the Academy. However, the 
framework also provides the means to explore strategies that would optimally be used by an intelligent 
terrorist. We argue that the optimal terrorist strategy is diametrically opposed to the economic strategy 
of a benevolent government. A benevolent government will choose those policies that show the 
maximum incremental gain in social (consumer + producer) welfare. In contrast, the intelligent terrorist 
seeking to cause economic harm will select activities that maximize the loss of social welfare. 
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Determining the economic criteria that optimizes the terrorist’s strategy is a major goal of this paper. The 
terrorist plays two key roles. First, the purpose of imposing terror is to impose fear. If fear persists in an 
economy, how does that impact the economic system as a whole? Second, the terrorist can take actions 
to decrease supply and or demand, but if a terrorist were to choose from a range of possible targets, 
what would be the criteria ultimately used to maximize economic harm? The two roles are not 
independent. For example, by interrupting the physical supply chain, the terrorist can cause economic 
harm through an artificial price increase, but by creating fear, and ultimately hysteresis, the terrorist can 
exacerbate the economic losses by affecting human behavior. Our theoretical results show that the 
optimal target would be a product with a highly inelastic demand, and the impact of hysteresis makes 
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The Modern Biological Warfare threat




Relationship to Food Security and Risk Perceptions 
Figure 1 shows in a very general way the evolution of chemical and biological weapons over time. 
Progressively, the fear is that food borne illnesses can be purposefully inserted into the food system in a 
number of ways
7. Appendix A has been compiled to illustrate a chronology of natural, military, and 
terrorist events including the use of food borne pathogens and attempts to affect agricultural crops. 
However from an economic and risk perception point of view there is a difference between historical 
artifacts and real behavior in a significant way. A threat of a bioterrorist attack on the food system will 
have significantly different attributes of perceived risk than an actual attack. It is entirely possible that a 
consumer, fully aware of the possibility of an attack does not perceive the threat as risky enough to 
challenge current buying behaviors. In contrast the perception of risk following an actual attack will be 
significantly different and can have a real economic impact. 
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Agricultural Security: Guarding Against Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks Affecting Health, National Food 
Supplies and Agricultural Economics T.W. Frazier and D.C. Richardson editors, Annals of the New York Academy of 
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We can hypothesize, as in figure 2, a relationship between economic damage and the chance of 
a threat
8. In Figure 2 the downward sloping curve represents the likelihood of an event happening. The 
chance of a hoax is much higher in probabilistic terms than an attack using a contagious agent by a state, 
but the economic consequence of a state-sponsored attack (an inevitable consequence of which will be 
war) will ultimately come at a higher economic costs. Hoaxes will occur more frequently than any 
outcome, and while a hoax may have some economic impact, risk perceptions will dissipate quickly. 
Whether an attack is viewed as a contagion (widely dispersed) or not will also affect the economic 
impact, as will a determination that it is state-sponsored or not. A localized adulteration that is not state-
sponsored will have a smaller effect because it will be perceived as localized and short lived. If it is state 
sponsored, risk perceptions would differ since the same event could be viewed as a sustained attack. 
As the perception of risk increases so will the economic impacts. The combined affects of a wide 
spread attack (contagion or contagious in the case of human disease) the perceptions of risk will be 
even higher and so will the economic impact. 
Each of these elements are critical to the conceptual understanding of terrorism, and while the 
model is structured from theory, its calculus establishes a number of testable hypotheses on a broad 
range issues related to markets, trade, consumer perceptions, producer responses, and risk perception.  
 
Hysteresis and Risk Perceptions 
Terrorist attacks against the food system can occur in many ways and points across the food supply 
chain. Terrorist objectives can be confined to causing economic damage, sickness or death to animals, 
plants and humans or both. If the objective is to kill humans, then it is unlikely that the food system 
would be used as a vector since more powerful biological agents (e.g. anthrax, plague, small pox) than 
food-borne illnesses or zoonoses are available. In this regards, agroterrorism can be distinguished from 
bioterrorism in that the former is directed towards economic damage while the latter is a direct assault 
on human life. Agroterrorist attacks can be targeted towards a) production (supply) without causing a 
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Guarding Against Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks Affecting Health, National Food Supplies and Agricultural 






behavioral or structural shift in demand, b) consumption (demand) without causing a behavioral or 
structural shift in supply, or c) both supply and demand. The welfare impacts are discussed further 
below. 
An important problem in understanding the relationship between agricultural/food economics 
and terrorism is in identifying how terrorism, real or threatened, impacts economic behavior. Important 
elements to understanding this problem are risk perceptions and economic hysteresis since it is 
principally these elements of human behavior that cause shifts in, and changes to the structure of, 
demand systems. Risk perception relates to the cognitive ability of humans to perceive and judge risks.  
Its emergence as a field of study has often been described as a challenge to the rationality of the 
expected utility hypothesis (Arrow 1982)
9 in that it requires the consistent use of conditional 
probabilities to revise beliefs as new information evolves over time. The representativeness heuristic of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974
10,1978
11) for example stipulates that individuals judge future events by 
the similarity of  the present evidence to it (Arrow, 1982). Bocker and Hanf (2000)
 12 have explored 
this idea in the context of food safety. They present a model based on Baye’s theory that allows 
individuals to revise their ‘trust’ in a food supplier after a food scare. They note that after a food scare 
demand drops, but then slowly builds as probabilistic assessments of food safety from the supplier 
increases.  The mechanism is through reassurance, but Liu et al (1998)
13 have found that reassurance 
may not cause full restoration. In other words, simply removing the source of uncertainty is not sufficient 
to regain consumer confidence and a return to initial demand. This may be because food safety has a 
strong credence component due to the ambiguous causality between eating a food product and getting 
sick (Caswell and Mojduska, 1996)
14. A consequence of credence is that individuals need more than 
personal experience to judge the safety of a food item, and rely on third party information (e.g. the 
supplier) to regain trust and reduce uncertainty (Bocker and Hanf, 2000).  For example, Henson and 
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11 Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice” Science 211 (1981):453-
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12 Bocker, A and H. Claus-Hennig “Confidence Lost and –Partially-Regained: Consumer response to Food Scares” 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 43(2000):471-485. 
13 Liu, S, J.C. Huang and G.L. Brown “Information and Risk Perception: A Dynamic Adjustment Process” Risk 





15 show that German respondents to a survey indicated that they would look at country of origin 
in order to qualify food safety. In a non-food example, Zikmund and Scott (1977)
16 provide evidence 
that a promoter/marketer can increase product demand by identifying product characteristics that 
potential buyers perceive as being risky, and advertising more positive attributes in order to encourage a 
revision of probabilities.  
The evidence of risk perceptions has also manifested itself in larger food scares. For example 
worldwide bans imposed on British beef products contributed to the cutback of export markets worth 
at least $2.4 billion as the price of beef went to zero in the U.K. when the link between BSE and CJD 
was discovered (Brown 1999). In 2001/2 three cases of BSE in Japan caused a 50% drop in beef 
sales (Wheelis et al 2002, Watts 2001)
17. After the lacing of grapes with cyanide, consumers refused to 
buy all types of Chilean fruit. Subsequent suspensions of Chilean fruit imports by US, Canada, 
Denmark, and Hong Kong cost Chile more than $210 million loss in profit and damaged its relationship 
between the United States (Casagrande, 2000). Even when adulteration is accidental, the economic 
effects can have long-standing economic consequences. For example, raspberries from Guatemala 
infected consumers in Canada and the U.S. with cyclosporiasis between 1996 and 1999. Despite best 
efforts by Guatemala to improve the image of food safety and to identify growers at-risk, it became 
evident that consumers were unable to identify individual brands as being safer than others and markets 
dwindled. In 1998, the FDA issued an import alert (a quarantine mechanism) while the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency allowed imports from growers deemed as low risk. However, while no further 
reports of cyclosporia were found in the U.S., raspberries from medium risk growers were commingled 
with raspberries from low risk growers causing a further outbreak in Canada. Subsequent import 
restriction were modified in 1999, but by 2000 only 77 of the 369 Guatemalan farms growing 
raspberries in 1998 continued to produce. Despite controls placed by Guatemala, Canada, and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Caswell, J. and E. Mojduszka “Using Information Labeling to Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(1996):1248-1253. 
15 Henson, S.J. and J. Northen “ConsumerPerceptions of Beef Safetyand the Implications for the Quality Policy” 
Paper presented at the 56
th EAAE-Seminar “Long Term Prospects of the Beef Industry” Paris france, Feb 26-27 1998. 
16 Zikmund, W.G. and J.E. Scott “An Investigation of the Role of Product Characteristics in Risk Perception” review 
of Business and Economic Research 13(Fall 1977):19-34 
17 Wheelis, M, R. Casangrande, and L.V. Madden “Biological Attack on Agriculture:Low Tech, High Impact 
BioScience 52(7)(July 2002):569-576 




U.S. the perceived risk to reputation was too great for many importing firms to take, even when 
Guatemalan raspberries sold at a discount. Furthermore, the decline in demand for Guatemalan 
raspberries declined for all seasonal crops even though cylospora was never found in fall and winter 
crops (Calvin et al 2002)
18. 
The issue is why consumer resistance persists either when the probabilities of harm are so low 
(e.g. BSE and Creutzfeld-Jacob Disease CJD), when terrorist activities were resolved (e.g. Chilean 
grapes) or safeguards put in place to protect the food supply (e.g. Guatemalan raspberries)? One 
argument is what we will refer to as consumer hysteresis. To paraphrase Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
19 
consumer hysteresis is a phenomenon that causes consumers to fail to reverse their consumption habits 
when the underlying source of uncertainty or ambiguity has reversed itself. There is a time-dependency 
between what has occurred in the past and what is observed in the present. One of the definition 
provided by Katzner (1999)
20 is that hysteresis is brought about when changes in the state of a system 
by alterations in parameter values cannot be reversed by restoring those values to their original values. 
Gocke (2002)
21 adds to this the notion of permanence as a constituent characteristic of hysteresis, but in 
economic systems the notion of permanence is difficult to uphold. Rather, we weaken the definition of 
hysteresis to include short-term effects that may or may not persist in a time series. In other words, a 
weak-form hysteresis can permit a path dependency for which, ultimately, the (Bayesian) revision of 
probabilities is sufficient to restore equilibrium to its pre-shock levels, at least approximately or 
qualitatively.  
As a case in point consider the data in figure 3, which was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analyses (BEA). The data is from direct and indirect sales data from some of the sectors in 
the tourism and hospitality industry, indexed to the third quarter of 2000. The figure shows the transient 
and seemingly permanent effects of the September 11
th 2001 terrorist attacks. The most striking 
response is the rapid decrease in air travel, which up until late 2002 still had not recovered, despite 
                                                 
18 Calvin. L., W. Foster, L.Solorzano, J.D. Mooney, L. Flores, and V. Barrios “Response to a Food Safety Problem in 
Produce: A Case Study of a Cyclosporiasis Outbreak” in Global Food Trade and Consumer Demand for Quality B. 
Krissoff, M. Bohman, and J.A. Caswell, editors, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers New York, 2002 
19 Dixit, A.K. and R.S. Pindyck Investment Under Uncertainty Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1994. 





significant price reductions on some major routes. Likewise hotel stays also fell significantly and had only 
modestly returned to pre-September 11
th levels. On the other hand, there is little evidence that 
restaurant services, at least outside of the NY area, were affected, and there seemed to have been a 
positive and persistent impact on movie-going. Qualitatively, the tourism industry has not fully recovered 
from the devastating impacts of the September 11
th attacks even with significant efforts by government 
to provide physical security and reassurance. 
The problem is in understanding what causes the path dependence of consumer hysteresis in the 
age of on-going terrorism and terrorist threats. Explanations of behavior are limited and empirical 
measurement of the effects of terrorism is rare. Fleischer and Buccola (2002)
22 examine the effects of 
terrorism on hotel stays in Israel. They employ a supply and demand framework that includes a terrorist 
index on the demand equations for domestic and foreign tourism. Foreign demand is price elastic and 
sensitive to terrorist events while domestic demand is price inelastic and quite insensitive to terrorist 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 Gocke, M. “Various Concepts of Hysteresis Applied in economics” Journal of Economic Surveys 16(2) (2002):167-
188. 
22 Fleischer, A. and S. Buccola “War, Terror and the Tourism Market in Israel” Applied Economics 34(2002) 1335-
1343 
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effects. Fleisher and Buccolla (2002) found that the main reduction in hotel stays occurred nearly two 
months after a terrorist event. Apparently, fixities in planning would prohibit cancellation prior to two 
months, and for three months after the event, memory and risk perceptions faded. In this case hysteresis 
was short-lived. 
As a case in point we can examine the consumer confidence index from the monthly survey of 
the University of Michigan. The index itself is a compilation of five factors relating to perceptions about 
the economy and how economic factors impact individual beliefs. Figure 4 illustrates the index for the 
Northeast United states as well as the U.S. average from January 2000 to August 2002. Although 
confidence was declining prior to September 11
th 2001, there is a clear and marked decline, which is 
labeled the hysteresis band in the figure. It took four or five months for the events of September 11
th to 
dissipate. What is notable, and expected is the difference in confidence between the North East and the 
U.S. in general. The loss of confidence was much higher for the North East, even though confidence in 
the North East mirrored the U.S. before this. Furthermore, consumer confidence index mirrors to a 
great extent the BEA data in figure 3, which also shows a rapid decline in some markets, followed by a 
rather precipitous recovery. However it is clear by the data that risk perceptions remained high enough 
in some markets for the impacts to be felt well into 2002, i.e. the airline industry, when the terrorist 
















































































































































































































attacks of 2001 used hijacked airplanes as a weapon. Qualitatively, consumer hysteresis can appear to 
be transient in some markets and persistent in others, but whether or not hysteresis is persistent in a 
hidden way, vis a vis a formal test for a unit root, requires a more detailed analysis. 
So how does hysteresis manifest itself in an economic model? We argue that there are dual 
effects on the consumer side. First, the original shock causes a downward shift in the demand curve, 
lowering demand across the board. In an econometric model, this would be represented by a time 
dependant dummy variable that will eventually converge to zero in the limit. Second, we argue that the 
behavior itself is not simply linear, but there is also a nonlinear manifestation caused by enhanced risk 
perception that causes the demand to become more inelastic. By becoming more inelastic, consumers 
become more resistance to decreases in prices that could restore demand to its pre-terrorist level. In a 
classical economic framework, it is assumed that any disruption to an economic system is reversible 
through the ordinary mechanics of supply and demand, which could involve a deterministic path 
dependency through a cob-web cycle. However, when it comes to issues of food safety and security, 
an immediate response to resolution of a food security issue appears to be more of an exception than a 
rule. 
In this section we present a deterministic model of hysteresis that illustrates how hysteresis can lead to 
welfare losses in the economy. Our approach is to define both the supply and demand as functions of  
hysteresis and to then define the equilibrium price accordingly. We step through the model examining 
demand effects first, assuming no hysteresis in supply, and then proceed to supply effects assuming no 
hysteresis in demand. We do not mathematically examine the possibility of hysteresis affecting both 
demand and supply simultaneously, but do discuss the effects in a more general and graphical way. 
 
It is assumed that the demand function is defined by 
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where A and B are intercept constants, h is an index of hysteresis (1>h>0) with demand and supply 
intensity coefficients of d and g, price P, and elasticities ed, es . The parameters a and b are multipliers 
that measure the sensitivity of the demand and supply elasticities to hysteresis. The general framework 
admits that there are dual impacts on supply and demand. The first is the possibility of a shift in the 
curves, while the second is a twist in the curves, making both more inelastic.  Setting demand equal to 
supply and solving for the equilibrium price gives 
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The complexity of hysteresis can be seen by differentiating the equilibrium price with respect to h. It is 
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and it is ambiguous in sign. Hysteresis will have a negative impact on the equilibrium price if the demand 
shift intensity exceeds the supply shift intensity a>b and the demand elasticity sensitivity exceeds the 
supply elasticity sensitivity, d>g. The price will increase if   a<b and  d<g and  £ 
 +  es ed
-  +  b a h
. 
To examine the economics in parts set g=0 and b=0 so that hysteresis only impacts demand. Then  
(5)  
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which will be negative for h<1. That is the greater the intensity on A the lower will be the equilibrium 
price, all other things being equal. This effect establishes the shift impact of hysteresis. The twist impact 
of hysteresis can be established by taking the derivative of (5) with respect to the elasticity sensitivity 
parameter ; 
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Assuming A> B, equation (7) will be negative for low values of h, but as h increases the term in logs 
could become negative so the ceterus paribus result could be an increase in prices as demand becomes 
more inelastic. However the combined effect of a negative shift and a more inelastic demand would 
most likely result in an overall net decrease in equilibrium prices. 
 
The net effect of a change in the hysteresis is  
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The conditions of course are dependent on our choice of functional form and are not general, however 
the above model does provide the requisite insight into how hysteresis, at least in the short term, can 
move an equilibrium and affect economic welfare. However, equations (1)-(8) clearly shows the two 
distinct effects. The first right hand side element in the bracketed term represents the shift due to the 
intercept while the second shows the effect due to a change in elasticity. Relative to the initial state, the 
demand curve shifts towards the origin (zero) and becomes steeper. The net effect is that the quantity 




supply curve, namely it will shift to the left, decreasing supply and will, as a result of risk aversion and 
higher marginal costs, become more inelastic. 
  The demand shift will most likely be transitory. In reality the variable h will change over time. As 
with the events of  September 11 2001, the fear dissipated in time for some markets, but persisted in 
others. Therefore the net welfare loss should not be considered permanent, but transitory with a path 
dependent return to equilibrium. The rate  at which it returns to its pre-hysteresis state depends, 
politically on the preparedness of government and the resolve of society in general. 
  The welfare effects are illustrated in Figure 5 which illustrates an attack focusing on consumer 
demand. Given the supply, which we assume does not change in this scenario, and the original demand 
D1, the equilibrium is at consumption C1 and at price P1. Given an incident, the demand shifts and 
becomes more inelastic. The resulting consumption is at C2 and price P2. On the original demand, 
consumer surplus is a+b and producer surplus is c+d+e. After the event, consumer surplus falls to a+c 
and producer surplus is reduced to e. The net welfare loss is b+d. 
  In Figure 6, supply also shifts and become more inelastic. The shift is due to a reduction in 
quantity while the decreased elasticity is due to increased marginal costs and risk aversion. When both 
supply and demand are affected the welfare losses increase. In Figure 6, the net welfare loss due to 
reductions in consumer and producer surplus is b+c+f+j+k. 
  Figure 7 shows the welfare effects of an attack on the supply with an intent to disrupt the supply 
chain. Consumers are not at risk in this model, but the effect of a decrease in supply is to increase prices 
along the demand curve. As in Figure 6, the supply curve twists due to increased risk aversion and 
marginal costs of production. Before the shock, consumer surplus equals a+b+c+d and producer 
surplus=e+f+g. After the shock, consumer surplus is reduced by a+ b. Area b is to the benefit of 
producers, but producers also lose areas f+g. The net reduction to social welfare is therefore c+d+f+g. 
The net welfare losses are contingent on the demand elasticities. In general, an attack on supply 
facing a highly elastic demand could in some circumstances increase firm profits, at the expense of 
consumers. Likewise a reduction in demand will not have as great an impact, when the supply function is 
more elastic than demand. Consequently, from an economic point of view, an intelligent terrorist would 







































































Figure 6: Welfare Effect due to Demand and Supply Shocks 

















































The threat of a terrorist attacks against the agricultural and food system is believed by many to be 
imminent. However, there has been surprisingly little research to determine what the economic impacts 
of terrorism can be. This paper has discussed terrorism in many contexts and has illustrated the use of 
terrorism on the food sector over time. The paper argues that there are several behavioral 
characteristics that must be adjudicated before a complete understanding can be made. The difference 
between a threat versus an action will have different economic impacts. However, this paper argues that 
fear of a terrorist act upon the food system can linger in what we refer to as consumer hysteresis. We 
argue that hysteresis in an economic system is a path dependent process that removes economic 
equilibrium away from steady state for a prolonged period of time. Proof of hysteresis at this juncture is 
elusive, but there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that consumer hysteresis exists. The time response of 
consumers to regain trust in air travel following the September 11, 2001 attacks is a case in point, as is 
the University of Michigan Consumer confidence index, which showed a marked decline following 9/11, 
with at least four years to recovery. Our argument is that hysteresis is manifested in an economic system 
through a shift in the demand curve as well as a reduction in the elasticity of demand. Similar effects can 
also be argued for supply. Whether hysteresis is systemic in the economy is an empirical issue that will 
require a variety of econometric techniques such as partial adjustment models, that can include path-








Locale  Event  Cause  Comment 
B.C.    Scythian archers dipped arrowheads in manure and 
rotting corpses to increase the deadliness of their 
arrows.23 
Military 
1340  Ukraine  During the siege of Kaffa (modern day Ukraine) in 
the 1340s, invading tatars forces catapulted plague 
victims into the city. It is believed that retreating 
forces from the city contributed to the second 
plague epidemic in Europe. 
 
Military 
Some of the earliest recordings of bio warfare that 
indicates an early awareness of the biological 











th century nearly 25% of the population of 
Europe succumbed to bubonic plague in the Black 
Death. The Great Plague of London in 1665 was 
killing 7,000 people per week. The last bubonic 
plague pandemic started in China 19 1894, 
spreading around the world, including North 
America, killing over 12 million (Alibek 2000) 
Natural  Caused by poor sanitary conditions and transferred 
by fleas, the pandemics are illustrative of the ferocity 
of a biological infection. Today outbreaks are still 
found, but treatment with antibiotics reduces 
mortality and the ability of the disease to spread. 
However (Alibek 2000) reports that the Russians 
were developing a super plague that was resistant to 












Following the many waves of military campaigns 
from Asia to Europe, rinderpest, or cattle plague, 
swept Western Europe killing over 200 million 
head of cattle. The 1857-1866 epidemic killed 
most cattle in Europe, and in 1889 the “Great 
Rinderpest Pandemic” was introduced to Africa by 
invading Italian troops. Over 90% mortality in 
Accidental  The story as told by Torres (1999) shows how 
disease had shaped policy and cultures. Rinderpest 
epidemics led to the formation of the first 
biostrategies in 1741 which included quarantine and 
burial, as well as to the foundation of the first 
veterinary school in the UK . In Africa it caused the 
weakening of cattle keeping tribes in Africa and 
                                                 






Locale  Event  Cause  Comment 
cattle and oxen were found in some regions. 
Giraffe and African buffalo populations were also 
severely affected. 




During the French and Indian War in 1763, British 
forces in Pennsylvania distributed blankets used by 
smallpox victims to the Delaware Indians in an 
effort to reduce the number of opposing forces. 
This resulted in a smallpox epidemic among the 
Native American population. 
 
Military  With no natural protections to European diseases, 
this illustrates the deadly possibilities of taking an 
endemic disease from location to a region where the 
disease is non-existent (see the story about Ebola 
Reston in 1989 for a counter argument) 
1917-
1918 
France  During World War I, German agents used anthrax 
and glanders as an equine disease to infect 
livestock and pack animals used for transporting 
supplies. 
 





Japan was involved in developing sophisticated 
techniques to deliver and spread fungi, bacteria, 
and nematodes on grains and vegetables in 
Manchuria and Siberia with airdrops of infected 
grains of wheat millet and cotton as well as anthrax 
and glanders (Runge, 2002). 
 
Military  It is unknown how effective these techniques were. 
1942  Stalingrad, 
Russia 
In 1942 the Nazi campaign in southern Russia 
ground to a halt with a significant outbreak of 
Military  This may or may not be true. According to Alibek 
(2000) the usual numbers of infection were 10,000. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
24 Torres, A. “International Economic Considerations Concerning Agricultural Diseases and Human Health Costs of Zoonotic Diseases” in Food and Agricultural 
Security: Guarding Against Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks Affecting Health, National food Supplies and Agricultural Economics Edited by T.W. Frazier and 







Locale  Event  Cause  Comment 
tularemia. Infection soon hit the Russian ranks, with 
over 100,000 troops infected. 
Alibek suspects that the Germans were infected 
first, but then the wind shifted or rats carried 
tularemia back to the Russian lines. The story 
indicates how hard it would be to employ 
battleground bio-warfare when a sudden shift in 
wind can infect own troops. A tularemia weapon 
was developed in 1941 by the Russians. 
1943  Europe  The Nazi regime experimented with dropping 
potato beetles from planes as well as the use of 
turnip weevils, antler moths, potato stalk rot, 
potato tuber decay and various weed.  
 
Military  It is unknown how effective these techniques were. 
1943  Germany  French focused on potato beetles and rinderpest 
virus in cattle directed at Germany25.  
 
Military  It is unknown how effective these techniques were. 
1944/19
45 
Great Britain  Britain stockpiled 5 million anthrax-laced cattle 
cakes to be dropped from aircraft, a nd had a 
program underway for the use of foot-and-mouth 
disease and plague. 
 
Military  Planned but not employed 
Post 
War 
U.S.A  After World War II, the U.S. Army carried out at 
least 31 tests and stored rice and wheat blast 
fungus at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and at the 
Rocky Mountain, Colorado. 
 
Military   
1950s/ 
1960s 
Brazil  Land speculators (reportedly) sent infected people 
into the Matto Grosso of Brazil in an effort to infect 
Domestic 
Terrorism 
This is reported in Wheelis et al (2001) following 
Davis (1977) in an effort to describe a low-tech 
                                                 






Locale  Event  Cause  Comment 
native aboriginal tribes. The speculators could then 
buy inexpensive land once they were uninhabited 
approach to spreading disease. A current concern is 
that terrorists, seeking martyr status, would infect 
themselves with small pox and then simply wander 
through airports and large U.S. cities.26 
1960  U.S.A  U.S. Air Force produced anti-plant disease agents 
at Pine Bluff, Arkansas and tested wheat stem in 
North Dakota. 
 
Military  Never applied in practice 
1964-
1965 
U.S.A  U.S. Air Force tested anti-animal pathogens at 
stockyards in many states. 
 
Military  Never applied in practice 
1970  Alabama  The water supply of 1,000-acre farm near Ashville, 
Alabama, operated by a group of African 
American Muslims, was poisoned. This led to the 




Perhaps the first recorded case of bioterrorism in 
the United States 
1970-
1990 
USSR  Soviets used ticks to transmit foot-and-mouth 
disease. They also conducted experiments with 
rinderpest, African swine fever, bovine 
pleuropneumonia, mutant forms of avian flu, and 
ecthyma in sheep. They also experimented with 
wheat, barley and tobacco mosaic streak viruses, 
wheat funguses and brown leaf rust (Alibek, 1999; 
Runge, 2002) as well as wheat rust, rye blast, and 
rice blast (Alibek 1999). 
 
Military  Never applied in practice, however since the 
democratization of the Soviet Union and the 
elimination of the Russian biopreparat program, 
Russian germ scientists were frequently invited to 
job fairs in Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The 
Iranians in particular were interested in bioweapons 
applied to livestock and crops. 
1978  Israel  A Palestinian group used mercury to contaminate  Domestic   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         






Locale  Event  Cause  Comment 
Israeli citrus exports to Europe. 
 
Terrorist 
1979  USSR  anthrax spores accidentally released from a Soviet 






1984  Oregon  Members of a religious cult led by Bagwan Shree 
Rajneesh poisoned salad bars with Salmonella in 
Dallas, Oregon in an effort to weaken residents 
and prevent them from voting in a local election.   
751 people became ill. The Cult also experimented 







Afghanis-tan  Soviet troops employed glanders against the 
Mujaheddin in the mountains of Afghanistan 
(Alibek 2000) 
Military  Alibek (1999) points out that glanders would have 
had the dual effect of sickening the Afghan soldiers 
and killing their horses. The story was told to Alibek 
by a senior officer but has never been confirmed. 
1985  Sri Lanka  A letter to the U.S. embassy claimed that tea 
exports to the United States was contaminated 









after the lacing of grapes with cyanide, consumers 
refused to buy all types of Chilean fruit. Subsequent 
suspensions of Chilean fruit imports by US, Canada, 
Denmark, and Hong Kong cost Chile more than 
$210 million loss in profit and damaged its 
relationship between the United States 
                                                 






Locale  Event  Cause  Comment 
(Casagrande, 2000).  
1982-
1984 
Afghanis-tan  Soviet troops employed glanders against the 
mujaheddin in the mountains of Afghanistan (Alibek 
2000) 
Military  Alibek (1999) points out that glanders would have 
had the dual effect of sickening the Afghan soldiers 
and killing their horses. The story was told to Alibek 
by a senior officer but has never been confirmed. 
1986  UK  BSE was first diagnosed in 1986 and linked to 
human disease in the form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease in 1995 making it one of the most 
debilitating zoonose viruses. By 1998 174,000 
cattle had been reported infected with the disease, 
but estimates of actual diseased cattle exceed 1 
million (Murphy 1999). It is believed that the 
disease morphed from sheep scrapies to BSE and 
then to CJD.28 In 1996 all cattle over the age of 




A possible target for economic terrorism and 
therefore worthy of note.In the 1990s, the outbreak 
of BSE cost the UK government between $9 and 
$14 billion in compensation costs to farmers 
affected by the slaughter of their cattle, and 
employees laid off in the dairy and beef industries. 
In addition, worldwide bans imposed on British beef 
products contributed to the cutback of e xport 
markets worth at least $2.4 billion as the price of 
beef went to zero in the U.K. when the link between 
BSE and CJD was discovered (Brown 1999). In 
2001/2 three cases of BSE in Japan caused a 50% 
drop in beef sales (Wheelis et al 2002, Watts 
2001)29 
 
1996  Arizona  a fungus disease called karnal bunt, a fungal 
disease of wheat that gives it an unpleasant odor 
and taste, was discovered in wheat seeds in 
Natural/Acc
idental 
A possible target for economic terrorism and 
therefore worthy of note. Following the discovery of 
karnal bunt, more than fifty U.S. trading partners, 
                                                 
28 Murphy, F.A.  “The Threat Posed by the Global Emergence of  Livestock, Food-Borne, and Zoonotic Pathogens” in Food and Agricultural Security: Guarding 
Against Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks Affecting Health, National food Supplies and Agricultural Economics Edited by T.W. Frazier and D.C. Richardson. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences , Vol 894 
29 Wheelis, M, R. Casangrande, and L.V. Madden “Biological Attack on Agriculture:Low Tech, High Impact Bioterrorism” BioScience 52(7)(July 2002):569-576 






Locale  Event  Cause  Comment 
Arizona (Kohnen, 2000).  including China, the largest importer of U.S. wheat 
adopted phytosanitary trade restrictions against the 
United States. Control and clean up by the USDA’s 
Animal and Plant Heath Inspection Service 
(APHIS) cost an estimated $45 million. The impact 
on exports was $250 million compared to the $6 
billion total value of U.S. wheat exports (Kohnen, 
2000). Horn and Breeze (1999) suggest that had 
international trading partners imposed border 
sanctions the loss could have exceeded $6 billion.30 
 
1993  Milwaukee , 
Wisconsin 
Cryptosporidium (an intestinal parasite) was found 
in the water supply. This contamination resulted in 
more than 400,000 illnesses and possibly 100 
deaths. 
 
Natural  While not terrorist related, the episode is illustrative 
of how a pathogen can be introduced in to the water 
system to cause harm to humans and animals. A 
possible target for economic terrorism and therefore 
worthy of note 
1995  Intern-ational  Sorghum ergot pandemic started in Brazil in 1995v 
and spread to Australia (1996) and the U.S. and 
Mexico (1997). The rate of infection was swift 
with 800,000 sq km infected one month after 
identification in Brazil. Within a week of 
confirmation in Australia 16,000 sq km were 
infected and within a month 70,000 sq km. By 
Natural  Bandyopadhyay and Frederiksen (1999) use this 
pandemic to illustrate the effects  of introducing a 
new pathogen into the production system. From 
1996-1998 APHIS spent over $60 Million in 
combating the disease, while growers in the affected 
areas lost over $100 million from lost sales and 
increased costs of production (Wheelis et al 2001) 
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1997 it had hit the sorghum growing regions of the 
U.S. (Bandyopadhyay and Frederiksen, 1999)31 
1995  Japan  The Aum Shinrikyo sect released sarin into a 
Japanese subway during morning rush hour and 





1996  Japan  A hospital worker introduced Shigella dysenteriae 
into food eaten by 13 co-workers.  Nine of the 





1996  Wisconsin  Brian Lea, an owner of an animal-food processing 
facility, deliberately contaminated with chlordane 
feed products at National By-Products Inc., a 











Taiwan’s livestock sector was deeply affected by 
the outbreak of FMD on its huge hog farms. From 
the time the disease was exposed on a single farm, 
to the time it was announced, 27 other farms were 
infected. Within a week, 717 farms were infected 
and within three months Taiwan was fully infected 
and 4 million hogs were destroyed (Casagrande 
2002). The 2001 outbreak of the disease in Great 
Britain prompted the slaughter of more than 4 
millions farm animals, out of herds of approximately 
Accidental  While not terrorist related, the introduction of Foot 
and Mouth disease into the U.S. economy could be 
devastating. The Taiwan outbreak resulted in excess 
of 500,000 tons of pork meat being destroyed and 
in an indefinite ban on Taiwan's pork exports that 
caused Taiwan’s GDP to drop by 2% (Chalk, 
2000). It cost more than $5 billion, required to 
slaughter four million swine. Taiwan lost its principal 
export markets for pork particularly the Japanese 
market. Within one week of the outbreak, swine 
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60 million and caused billions of dollars in losses to 
farmers. 
prices dropped by 60% and about 50,000 people 
became unemployed and $6.9 billion was lost in 
export revenue. Three years later Taiwan did not 
fully regain its exports markets. The 2001 outbreak 
in Great Britain  caused billions of dollars in losses 
to farmers. It also lowered domestic consumption of 
beef in the U.K and reduce British beef exports that 
disrupted international trade. The ban imposed on 
British beef by European Union states severely 
strained London’s relations with its major European 
allies, exacerbating tensions in bilateral and 




Netherlands  An outbreak of classical swine fever infected 20 
new herds every week, despite vigilant containment 
efforts (Casagrande 2002) 
Accidental  The introduction of classical swine fever illustrates 
that FMD is not the only non endemic contagious 
disease to affect livestock in developed economies. 
2001  U.S.A.  Unknown individual(s) distributed anthrax spores 
through the U.S. Postal Service and caused 5 




The anthrax incident illustrated just how strained and 
fragile the North American socio-economic base 
was. Buildings were closed, government shut down, 
postal service and other courier businesses were 
halted, and the anthrax vaccine was in limited 
supply.   
 
2002    A shopkeeper, driven by jealousy and hatred of 
the owner of  a rival business, spiked breakfast 
foods with rat poison “Dushuqiang” banned by the 
Chinese government and killed 38 people and 
sickened hundreds in the city of Nanjing. 
Domestic 
Terrorism 
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